On 9th December 1959, a small convoy of vehicles left the settlement of Navrongo, on the border of Ghana and Upper Volta, and headed north. The convoy's passengers comprised an international team of peace campaigners, including the British anti-colonial cleric, Michael Scott, a
African unity'. 3 At the conference, held in Accra in April 1960, opposition to French nuclear weapons tests, which had originated as an attempt to mobilise European anti-nuclear campaigns, had metamorphosed into a pan-African protest against 'nuclear imperialism' and neo-colonialism.
The unsuccessful border crossings of the Sahara protest team provide an informative starting point for a wider discussion of transnational peace activism in the early 1960s. As a collaboration between the Ghanaian government, the British Direct Action Committee (DAC) and the US Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA), this was without doubt an event that was shaped by connections across national boundaries. However, before defining the framework in which these connections are to be explored, a brief note on the nature and viability of transnational history is required. Discussions of the merits (or otherwise) of a transnational approach invariably depart from a consideration of the relationship and distinctions between 'transnational', 'global' and 'world' history. 4 My contention is that a transnational approach is best understood as a methodological requirement when seeking a global perspective on post-1945 history. The transnational connections between European, US and African disarmament movements must be placed centre stage in a global history of anti-nuclear weapons movements of the early 1960s. As
Isabel Hofmeyr has suggested, not only are 'historical processes … made in different places but that they are constructed in the movement between places, sites, and regions'. 5 While histories of the emergence of popular movements opposed to nuclear weapons have taken account of their international dimensions, there continues to be a tendency to define the scope of enquiry by particular national or regional criteria. 6 The transnational dimensions of what was understood as a threat of global proportions, remain under-explored. 3 Meanwhile, networks that had emerged in support of anti-colonial movements were by nature transnational, bridging the space between international sympathizers and African political activists.
The Sahara protest thus reveals, according to one observer, how 'national liberation and nationbuilding, pan-Africanism and the radical, transnational peace movement were constitutive political struggles'. 7 Thanks to its status as one of the first African states to achieve independence, together with a political leadership strongly committed to pan-African and internationalist policies, Ghana was of critical international importance in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and has provided a focus for recent accounts setting the histories of US Civil Rights movements and African independence within a global social dynamics. 8 And yet, the interactions between transnational peace campaigns and the Ghanaian state was also shaped by what Kelly and Kaplan have described as the 'routinization of the nation-state'; relations between peace activists and government officials were both enabled and constrained by decolonization. 9 The history of peace activists' interactions with
Africa at the point of decolonization must therefore set any concerns with its transnational dimensions alongside those determined by the normative political entity, the nation-state.
Furthermore, the Sahara protest and the multi-lateral conferences on 'nuclear imperialism' that followed it also illustrate the ways in which pan-African politics interacted with pan-European social movements. While the momentum of protest against French nuclear weapons tests in the Sahara was sustained by African political activity, much of the initial organizational impetus for the protests came from within European pacifist and anti-nuclear movements. As such, the process of negotiating and engaging with the politics of African liberation reveals easily overlooked aspects of individuals and networks that operated across national borders and those that were -or sought to be -engaged with more formal political processes within emerging post-colonial nation states. The interconnectedness of national and international movements suggests that a transnational approach cannot always be concerned, as some have suggested, with a view of the nation as 'a thing contested, interrupted, and always shot through with contradiction'. 13 I would argue that it is necessary instead to configure transnational histories of anti-nuclear activism in such a way as to foreground the complex and contradictory, but nevertheless significant connections across borders that were re-shaped by the process of decolonization. In order to historicize transnational anticolonial or anti-nuclear peace movements in the 'context of decolonization', one must begin with the recognition that their activities were the bound up with the politics of the post-colonial State.
Lastly, it is also valuable to consider the most useful form in which transnational interactions should be conceived. Studies from the perspective of political science and international relations have tended in the past to focus on networks as a form of structure that sustains and channels One explanation for the failure to build a popular campaign in France cites nationalist sentiment; the desire to maintain -or regain -national prestige through a nuclear weapons programme. 24 This, together with the belief that support for a British-led campaign was complicity in 'foreign interference', underpinned the lack of French public enthusiasm for the Sahara project.
Trocmé argued firmly that protests against the French tests needed to be 'genuinely French, 8 had accepted that self-determination would play a role in defining the future status of Algeria, and it is striking that the detonation of an atomic bomb in the territory does not appear to have figured in public debate. 28 French public opinion appeared wary of 'extremist' opposition to the war, which goes some way to explain why the Sahara protest was rebuffed by the French delegates at the London Congress, fearful that it would be dismissed as 'Communist or anti-colonialist inspired'.
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French opposition to the tests was articulated by a small body of pacifist campaigners morally and politically opposed to anything that hinted of a connection with the FLN and its violent struggle against French colonialism. The non-Communist left in France were, arguably, far from 'anticolonial' in their perceptions of the struggle in Algeria, although at least one prominent figure was prepared to speak positively about the Sahara protest in private. 30 British campaigners nevertheless understood that the protest had to be insulated from any commentary on the war in Algeria to avoid alienating French opinion. In the context of a protest against French militarism, a 'complete pacifist demand' -that is, a campaign that embraced a call for an end to all violence in Algeria -was rejected as unworkable.
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Colonial issues were embedded in rather different ways within British anti-nuclear weapons protests, which were, in the eyes of some commentators, suffused with 'imperialist pacifism' and nationalist 'romantic protest'. 32 Campaigners for nuclear disarmament presented their movement as a pathway towards national redemption and the restoration of international power and prestige, with a non-nuclear Britain destined to become a neutral mediator between the Cold War superpowers and emergent 'non-aligned' nations. 33 In the wake of the Sahara protest, Michael When it came to the question of non-violence, western peace campaigners, despite having become attuned to the patterns of anti-colonial thought, were unable to relinquish the desire to shape discussion along the lines of their own ideological principles.
In the eyes of campaigners such as Scott and Sutherland, the moral force of the African revolution had been characterised by its tactics of non-violence. It had underpinned their support, and was a fundamental element of their own political philosophies. 48 In Ghana, the group were able to draw on sympathy and support from official channels, not least Nkrumah, who had championed a Despite the attention given to the crises in Algeria and South Africa, efforts were made to rekindle the anti-nuclear campaign that had provided the original impetus for the conference. Calls were made for a thousand African volunteers to form an enlarged Sahara protest, while plans were mooted to deploy African students in Europe as potential interlocutors between pan-African and western peace movements. 58 And, at the heart of Nkrumah's conference address was a pledge to Unity in Addis Ababa later that year. Boaten, however, recognised that he would 'have to work very hard to get the conference to give serious consideration' to his proposals. 81 Another short-lived legacy of the Assembly emerged from committee discussions on nuclear arms control and inspection procedures, chaired by the Irish politician and human rights activist, Seán MacBride.
Shortly after the Assembly, MacBride travelled to Geneva to deliver its report to national delegates at the ongoing disarmament talks. 82 He was, along with other observers, guardedly optimistic about the achievements of the Assembly, and noted that the Assembly reports were well-received by the delegates in Geneva. One US expert suggested that the discussions in Accra had avoided the dangers of leaning ideologically towards either Soviet or western views. Nor was the conference, as
British campaigners had reportedly feared, merely 'amateurish'. 83 There were, nevertheless, some clear reservations, including regrets that the non-aligned delegates were unable to make 'bolder proposals', with the result that committee discussions became dominated by American and Soviet experts and thus a 'replica of the Geneva Disarmament conference'. 84 Homer Jack noted that there were many 'inevitable disappointments', not least in the small number of African participants, but also the 'failure of the Assembly as a whole to take many positive stands on outstanding cold war problems'. 85 While western pacifists such as Jack were motivated in part by anti-communist convictions, cold war tensions -already a factor in the internal politics of movements such as SANE -were an evident constraint on international co-operation. 86 The form of non-alignment employed by the participants, described by Jack as 'a mathematical exercise in finding ideological equidistance between two poles', was perceived to be a far from effective route to disarmament. 87 The Accra Assembly could, nevertheless, be conceivably regarded as one of the first global gatherings of non-aligned peace organisations, superseding regional groupings such as the 
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has argued, 'reveal modernity to be a multifaceted process whereby political, economic, and cultural exchanges occur in varied and often unpredictable ways'. 91 European direct-action peace movements should be understood as being shaped by their engagement with, rather than their distinctions from anti-colonial nationalism in Africa.
The campaigns against 'nuclear imperialism' ultimately reflect the limits of transnational antinuclear campaigns in Europe and worldwide, but they also illustrate how the language of 'global' protest began to coalesce through the cross-border interactions of activist networks. The Sahara protest and the conferences that followed failed to bring a halt to French nuclear weapons tests, but the efforts to create an international movement against the tests shaped a practice of transnational activism that could be adopted, adapted and re-interpreted in particular national and local contexts.
The limits of transnationalism can be seen, however, in the interaction between these different spheres of activity, and in particular, the tension between global and national agendas. Nevertheless, while local, regional and national contexts continued to matter, the transnational connections that were developed through the processes of challenging the nuclear arms race and European colonialism constituted a new arena for the politics of communicative and contentious action. The Sahara protestors, although foiled in their attempts to infiltrate international borders, helped to give form to a political space that fostered the transmissions of values of social justice, human rights and environmental concern across the boundaries of the nation state.
